Accelerating Exports to Asia is the Only Way to Regenerate Japanese Agriculture

By SHINDO Eiichi
Professor Emeritus of Tsukuba University

The "manifesto campaign boom" shook the Japanese politics. Points in the political disputes are US-Japan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) related with the agricultural policies and the Japanese future growth strategies. Both of them would influence seriously the Japanese local economies such as those in Hokkaido prefecture, "a kingdom of agricultural economy" which has been in serious recession. The nature of election campaign manifestos is indication not only of the commitments on specific policies in the future but also of those in the past, just as the nature of the business contracts. We could, in this context, remember the past policies on the FTAs as well as the agricultural policies, which then Foreign Minister Aso Taro had advocated as part of the Japanese novel foreign policy named "the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity," comprising such democratic prosperous countries in the Asia-Pacific region as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan and Korea. Under such a grandiose foreign policy, he committed and pursued the FTA policy with Australia. The FTA with Australia as it was planned would have seriously damaged our agricultural sectors including those of Hokkaido prefecture. It has to be pointed out that the size of cultivated land in Japan and Korea per farming household is only about 1.5 hectares, whereas those in the U.S. and Australia are 196 hectares and 4100 respectively. This huge difference in the size of faming lands would end up in devastating the Japanese agricultural sectors even those of Hokkaido area. The past commitments on trade and agricultural policies have indicated the lack of the comprehensive strategy of public policies to regenerate our agriculture.

It is time to think over how Japan should deal with the impacts of the FTA just concluded between the U.S. and Korea, which completely ruled out rice as the subject of tariff free articles to protect the agricultural sector in Korea. Hence, it is time for us to regain the competitiveness in the U. S vis-à-vis Korean exported goods, and at the same time to explore the way to regenerate agriculture in Japan, The answer should be the dual strategies both to improve the deteriorated ratio of food self-sufficiency, and to take advantages of the current global revolution in information technologies and environment conservation. It is easy to promise, but difficult to realize, the improvement of the food self-sufficiency ratio and of the deteriorated welfare policies, so as to regain and maintain the economic growth, since the welfare policies would need the vast amount of financial revenue. The growth strategy would be impossible unless we make a radical shift from the conservative neoliberal policy sacrificing the weak and the social safety-nets. It would be also impossible to turn the current food self-sufficiency ratio from 40 percents, the lowest one among the developed countries, even to 50 percents, unless we make the drastic change in the traditional policies of depending heavily on the governmental subsidies that Japan has adopted for the past half a century. Even in the U.K., it took twenty years to improve the food self-sufficiency ratio from 45 percents in 1965 to over 70 percents in late 1980's. The key ingredient for the agricultural regeneration should be to adopt the "individual household income support system," which the EU countries including the U.K. have adopted. Hence, it is called the "EU formula." It certainly aims at fostering farmers by directly subsidizing each farming household based on the differences between the retail prices and the farms production costs against the imported agricultural goods.

In this respect, it is vitally important for the Japanese political parties either JDP or LDP to leave off the rice acreage reduction policy which has resulted in enormous increase in abandoned lands of cultivation. Instead, we should take the firm policy to stimulate the agriculture through the "individual household income support system." The current campaign manifestos of both the ruling party and the opposition remain fixed to a narrowly defined egocentric "one-country-approach." They have been so obsessed with the idea of the outmoded mythology of the Cold War centering on the U.S. -Japan alliance, using the semantics of the "diplomatic continuity." As a result, Japan has lost many chances to lead and coexist with Asia, which have been the driving forces of the world economy. We should take the strategy to expand export of our value-added agricultural products to the mega-market of rising and affluent East Asia. It will open up a window of opportunity to regenerate the Japanese agriculture. Hokkaido, "a kingdom of agricultural economy," with the comparatively large size of the farming land as the one in EU countries, would play a central role in initiating and pursuing this strategy through applying the edge of the information technology to the food industry sector. It is vital to enhance the added values of the agricultural products, to brand and commercialize them in broader affluent markets in Asia. The current agricultural sector is not the primary industry in a traditional sense any more. It has become so-called the "sixth industrial sector" multiplying both the second and the third ones through their closer cooperation with business, industrial and academic circles. Hokkaido would certainly contribute to revitalizing the Japanese agriculture and to building up the food supplying base for the regional food security regime in East Asia.

Regenerating the agriculture would also be one of the main vehicles to reduce the carbon dioxide, marking for strengthening the current environmental revolutionary movements through absorption of it by forests. These ecological policies were agreed and declared at the Hokkaido Toyako Summit in June 2008 and since then have been gradually implemented. Now we should promote more aggressively an East Asian community building with the emerging food and ecological security regime in East Asia and put forward a bolder strategy of strengthening the cooperative ties with Asia in these agricultural and environmental industry sectors as well. For the past 20 years, while the ratio of total amount of Japanese trade with the U.S. decreased from 27.4 to 13.7 percents, the one with China increased dramatically from 3.5 to 20.4 percents and the one with Asia makes up 48.8 and the one with Eurasia 73.9 percents respectively. This new reality of dramatic changes of global balance of power and trade indicates us the ways to regenerate Japan's economy and agriculture through our much closer ties with Asian nations.

Source: The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC) E-Letter (10 November 2009, Vol. 2, No. 7)

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Japan’s Rice Farmers Fear Their Future Is Shrinking

This broad coastal plain near the Sea of Japan, blessed with abundant water and rich soil and checkered with rice paddies hued golden yellow in the early spring, is one of the country’s most fertile granaries. But there is an unmistakable malaise here.

The farmers who work the paddies are graying and dwindling in number. Abandoned, overgrown plots are a common sight. Because of how small their farms are and how far rice prices have fallen, many farmers find it impossible to make ends meet.

“Japanese agriculture has no money, no youth, no future,” said one farmer, Hitoshi Suzuki, 57, who stood on his 450-year-old family farm as an icy wind blew from the sea.

The troubles on the farm are emblematic of an overall feeling of paralysis gripping Japan, the world’s second-largest economy. Faced with mounting challenges from an aging population and chronic low growth, the nation has tried to preserve the status quo, in essence by burning through its vast accumulated wealth, rather than make tough changes, economists say.
“Japan’s rural crisis offers a glimpse of the entire nation’s future,” said Yasunari Ueno, an economist at Mizuho Securities in Tokyo.

To hear many farmers and agricultural experts tell it, rural Japan is fast approaching some sort of dead end, the result of depopulation, trade liberalization and depleted government coffers. They speak of the worst rural crisis since World War II. In Shonai, farmland prices have dropped as much as 70 percent in the past 15 years, and the number of farmers has shrunk by half since 1990.

Across Japan, production of rice, the traditional staple grain, has fallen 20 percent in a decade, raising alarms in a nation that now imports 61 percent of its food, according to the government’s Statistic Bureau.

Aging is seen as the biggest problem in rural areas, where, according to the Agriculture Ministry, 70 percent of Japan’s three million farmers are 60 or older. Since 2000, soaring deficits have forced Tokyo to halve spending on public works projects, which propped up rural economies, and plunging exports have now eliminated factory jobs on which many farming households depended for extra income.

While the current global financial crisis has added to the grimness, the root causes lie in Japan’s rural economic system of tiny, woefully inefficient family farms, which dates back to the end of World War II. But while many farmers and agriculture experts agree that this system is breaking down, change has been blocked by an array of vested interests and a fear of disturbing the established ways.

The question now is whether some sort of breaking point might soon be reached.
A change could be significant because rural voters form the base of a political pyramid at whose apex stands the Liberal Democratic Party, which has governed Japan for more than half a century. The party is expected to face a tight race with the main opposition Democratic Party in general elections that must be called by early September.

In rural regions like Yamagata, the northern rice basket prefecture where Shonai is located, the signs remain mixed.

Takashi Kudo, the owner of a construction company here, said he remained a loyal supporter of Liberal Democratic lawmakers, who helped the local economy and his company with spending on local projects. Now, however, he said that his company’s sales have dropped by two-thirds over the last decade, forcing him to lay off half of his 23 employees.

Times are so tough that the local Shinto shrine has stopped hiring musicians for summer festivals, he said. Local residents feel abandoned by the party, leading to declining membership in election support groups, he said. But residents are not embracing the opposition, which he said suffered from the same lack of direction as the governing party.

“The reaction has been political disillusionment, not political revolt,” said Mr. Kudo, 45, sitting in his office below a photograph of his district’s Liberal Democratic lawmaker, Koichi Kato.
Still, there are growing calls here to give the Democrats a try. In January, a little-known school board member who ran as the opposition candidate unseated the incumbent Liberal Democrat to become governor of Yamagata, which had been firmly Liberal Democratic for generations.
“There is a feeling that the L.D.P. is growing out of touch with real rural problems,” said Takeshi Hosono, a director at Shogin Future-Sight Institute, a market research company based in the city of Yamagata.

Many Yamagata residents feel the party has gone too far in liberalizing trade and cutting public spending, Mr. Hosono said, reflecting resentment that cities like Tokyo have prospered in recent years while rural areas waned.

Others say they feel the Liberal Democrats have not gone far enough in reforms, complaining that the party and local groups that support it have been blocking local farmers from making big improvements that challenge the status quo.

One of those innovators is Kazushi Saito, a rice and pig farmer who six years ago took on one of rural Japan’s most powerful institutions, the national agricultural cooperative, by trying to establish his own, smaller, alternative co-op. He signed up 120 other farmers disgruntled with the national cooperative, which they said they felt only tried to sell them expensive machinery and fertilizer.

But when he sought to register his new co-op, as allowed by law, the prefectural agricultural officials refused to do the paperwork, effectively killing the plan, he said.
“Vested interests are running Japanese agriculture into a wall,” Mr. Saito, 52, said.
Mr. Saito and other farmers said the government also throws up barriers against the most obvious remedy to agriculture’s problems, the creation of larger, more efficient farms. The average Japanese commercial farm is now just 4.6 acres, compared with about 440 acres for the average American farm.

While the government says that such consolidation is needed, Mr. Saito and others say their efforts to accumulate land are hindered by price supports on farmland, which were intended to protect the value of small farmers’ assets but which make the property too expensive to buy. Limits on rice production, also intended to help small farmers by propping up rice prices, make it difficult to expand production, many farmers say.

Even with price supports, moreover, an easing of import restrictions and a decline in demand related to Japan’s changing eating habits have driven down rice prices, hurting farms of all sizes. This has fed rising anger not only with the Liberal Democrats but also with Japan’s powerful ministries, which have traditionally guided this nation but now seem unable to lead the way out of the morass.

“The postwar era of depending on Tokyo is clearly over,” said Shonai’s mayor, Maki Harada.
Mr. Suzuki, with the 450-year-old family farm, has quadrupled the land he tills to 40 acres, most of it rented from retired farmers. But inflated land prices, restrictions on rice production and the high cost of Japan’s highly mechanized farming have simply meant that his bigger farm loses more money than neighboring smaller ones, he said.

“Agriculture could resuscitate local economies, if it were made healthy again,” said Masayoshi Honma, a professor of agriculture at the University of Tokyo. “Without reform, it will just decline to death.”

Source: The New York Times, March 28, 2009

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Draft Jepang tentang MRL Chlorantranilprole, Metaflumizone, Methyl iodide, Paromomycin, dan Flunixin

Pada tanggal 11 Maret 2009 Standards and Evaluation Division, Department of Safety, Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) telah mengadakan Conference for Establishment of Maximum Residue Limits for Agricultural Chemicals (Chlorantranilprole, Metaflumizone, Methyl iodide, Paromomycin, and Flunixin) in Food di Kantor Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo.

Konferensi ini selain dihadiri oleh pejabat MHLW juga dihadiri oleh para perwakilan dari beberapa Kedutaan Besar di Jepang, termasuk KBRI Tokyo.

Latar Belakang

Dalam penjelasan artikel 11, paragraf 1 Food Sanitation Law, disebutkan bahwa MHLW berwenang menetapkan standar residu (Maximum Residue Limits: MRL) untuk pestisida, makanan tambahan, dan obat hewan (selanjutnya disebut bahan kimia pertanian) yang masih tersisa dalam makanan. Makanan yang dipasarkan di Jepang harus sesuai dengan standar yang telah di tetapkan oleh pemerintah Jepang.

Pada 29 Mei 2006, MHLW telah memperkenalkan sistem positive list untuk bahan kimia pertanian dalam makanan. Pada prinsipnya semua makanan yang didistribusikan di pasar Jepang harus mengikuti peraturan yang berazaskan pada sistem yang ditetapkan oleh MHLW tersebut.

MHLW akan menetapkan MRL terbaru untuk beberapa komoditi makanan, untuk itu MHLW telah menelaah secara komprehensif MRL yang selama ini berlaku. Kegiatan pengkajian ini ditujukan pada 5 bahan kimia yaitu Chlorantraniliprole (pestisida), Metaflumizone (pestisida), Methyl iodide (pestisida), Paromomycin (obat hewan) dan Flunixin (obat hewan).

Sebagai catatan bahwa sistem positive list ditetapkan berdasarkan pada amandemen 2003 Food Sanitation Law Jepang. Sistem ini bertujuan untuk melarang distribusi makanan di pasar Jepang apabila makanan tersebut mengandung bahan kimia pertanian melebihi kadar tertentu (0.01 ppm) yang telah ditetapkan oleh Peraturan yang berlaku.

Garis Besar Revisi MRL

1. Chlorantraniliprole (insektisida)

Chlorantraniliprole dilarang digunakan di Jepang. Pada saat ini Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) telah menetapkan aturan tentang bahan kimia ini berdasarkan Agricultural Chemical Regulation Law. Telah terdapat permohonan dari pengusaha asing untuk penetapan MRL bahan kimia ini. Selama ini mengacu pada peraturan MRL untuk bahan kimia pertanian yang digunakan diluar Jepang, yang dipublikasikan 5 Pebruari 2004. Untuk merespon kebijakan MAFF dan permintaan para pengusaha tersebut, MHLW telah menetapkan MRL baru untuk beberapa tanaman pangan. Sebelum ini di Jepang belum terdapat MRL Chlorantraniliprole untuk tanaman pangan.

Pada konferensi ini telah disampaikan draft MRL Chlorantraniliprole untuk Beras 0.05 ppm, Kedelai kering 0.2 ppm, Kentang 0.01 ppm, Kubis, Kubis China dan Brussels sprouts 4.0 ppm; Kol, Komatsuna, Kyona, dan Qing-geng-cai 11 ppm; Kol Kembang dan Broccoli 4.0 ppm; Watercress, Endive, Shungiku, Lettuce, Bayam, Seledri dan daun Seledri 13.0 ppm; Welsh 2.0 ppm; Tomat, Terung, Pimiento 0.7 ppm; Labu, Semangka, Melon 0.25 ppm; Mentimun 0.3 ppm; dan Kedelai hijau 1.0 ppm. MRL untuk buah Apel, Peach, Nectarine, Apricot, Japanese Plum, dan Cherry 1.0 ppm; Pear 0.5 ppm; Quince, Loquat, biji kapas 0.3 ppm; Strawberry 0.7 ppm; anggur 1.2 ppm; Teh 50 ppm. MRL untuk produk binatang daging sapi dan babi, lemak sapi dan babi, hati sapi dan babi, ginjal sapi dan babi, dan susu 0.01 ppm; dan hewan air 0.05 ppm.

2. Metaflumizone (insektisida)

Metaflumizone dilarang digunakan di Jepang. Pada saat ini MAFF telah menetapkan bahan kimia dimasukkan pada Agricultural Chemical Regulation Law. Sebelum ini di Jepang belum terdapat MRL Metaflumizone untuk tanaman pangan. Yang tergolong Metaflumizone meliputi (E)-Metaflumizone, (Z)-Metaflumizone, p(m-(trifluoromethyl)phenacyl)benzonitrile.

Pada konferensi ini telah disampaikan draft MRLs Metaflumizone untuk kubis 5 ppm sedangkan kubis China 10 ppm.

3. Methyl iodide (fumigant)

Methyl iodide dilarang digunakan di Jepang. Pada saat ini MAFF telah menetapkan bahan kimia ini diatur dengan Agricultural Chemical Regulation Law. Sebelum ini di Jepang belum terdapat MRL Methyl iodide untuk tanaman pangan.

Pada konferensi ini telah disampaikan draft MRL Methyl iodide untuk tomat dan melon 0.05 ppm dan chestnut 0.5 ppm. Sedangkan MRL untuk komoditi lain seragam yakni 0.01 ppm.

4. Paromomycin (antimicrobial)

Paromomycin dilarang digunakan di Jepang. MHLW telah menelaah secara komprehensif MRLs guna menetapkan pengenalan sistem baru sementara. MRL sementara yang berlaku pada saat itu berdasarkan pada Stadar Eropa (EU). Akan tetapi MHLW akan mencabut MRLs sementara tersebut yang pada saat ini masih tercatat dalam daftar MRL sementara (Item 7, Section A “General Compositional Standards for Food” Part I “Food” of the Specifications and Standardss for Food, Food Additives, Etc.). Menurut penilaian MHLW sangat sulit untuk menyusun standar berdasarkan alasan ilmiah karena Jepang tidak dapat mengkonfirmasi situasi yang pasti pada saat penetapan standar EU sebagai pedoman disebabkan keterbatasan informasi penting mengenai residu. Setelah revisi ini diberlakukan, Paramomycin (antimicrobial) ini tidak diperbolehkan tersisa dalam semua makanan, berdasarkan persyaratan Item 1, Section A yang menyebutkan bahwa makanan tidak boleh mengandung antimicrobial atau antibacterial sintetis. MRL yang selama ini berlaku untuk Paromomycin pada daging dan lemak sapi dan babi 0.5 ppm; hati dan ginjal sapi dan babi 2 ppm, daging dan lemak ayam dan unggas lain 0.5 ppm; hati dan ginjal ayam dan unggas lain 2 ppm, Salmoniformes, Anguiliformes, Perciformes, Shelled mollusks, Crustaceans, dan ikan dan binatang air lainnya 0.5 ppm. Setelah revisi ini disahkan dan diimplementasikan maka semua komoditi diatas tidak diperbolehkan mengandung Paromomycin dan antibacterial sintetisnya.

5. Flunixin (non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug)

Flunixin selama ini telah diperbolehkan digunakan di Jepang. Pada saat ini MAFF telah memutuskan untuk merevisi standar penggunaan bahan kimia ini yang mengacu pada Pharmaceutical Affairs Law. Untuk merespon kebijakan MAFF ini, MHLW telah menelaah secara komprehensif MRL yang sedang berlaku untuk menetapkan MRL baru. Draft MRL Flunixin untuk semua komoditi tidak terdapat perubahan, untuk daging sapi 0.02 ppm; hati sapi 0.3 ppm; daging babi 0.05 ppm; lemak sapi dan ginjal babi 0.03 ppm; lemak dan hati babi 0.2 ppm; ginjal sapi 0.1 ppm; dan susu (dalam bentuk 5-hydroxy flunixin) 0.04 ppm.

Sebelum revisi MRL ini diberlakukan, MHLW memberikan kesempatan kepada semua pihak untuk memberikan tanggapan terhadap draft revisi ini agar disampaikan sebelum tanggal 25 Maret 2009 kepada Standards and Evaluation Division, Department of Safety, Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 1-2-2 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8916, Telepon +81-3-5253-1111 Fax: +81-3-3501-4868. Contact person: Mr. Katsuhiro Ogi (ogi-katsuhiro@mhlw.go.jp)

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Zen Noh Koperasi Terbesar di Dunia

Zen Noh Jepang merupakan koperasi terbesar dari 300 koperasi yang diranking ICA. Dengan basis pertanian, jejaring Zen Noh telah merambah ke berbagai bisnis, yang menjangkau banyak negara. Padahal, koperasi ini baru dibentuk pada 1972, jauh lebih muda ketimbang koperasi-koperasi raksasa di Eropa dan Amerika Serikat.

Para petani Jepang, memiliki re­but tawar (bargaining position) yang luar biasa kuat, dalam konste­lasi ekonomi dan politik di negaranya. Sudah menjadi pengetahuan umum, kalau berbagai komoditi pertanian yang dihasilkan petani­nya, jauh lebih mahal ketimbang komoditi sejenis di negara lain. Tapi, pemerintah Jepang tidak bi­sa sembarangan mengimpor komoditi tersebut, tanpa persetujuan petani. Jatuhnya menteri pertanian karena mengabaikan aspirasi peta­ni, bukan hal yang aneh terjadi di Jepang.

Kekuatan luar biasa dimiliki peta­ni Jepang, antara lain karena mereka solid berhimpun dalam koperasi pertanian. Tapi, soliditas itu bukan cuma ditunjukkan untuk menekan (pressure group), melainkan juga da­lam me­ngembangkan jaringan bisnis. Dan, ini yang terpenting, semuanya memungkinkan lantaran para petani Jepang berhimpun dalam koperasi.

Koperasi pertanian Jepang, mem­bentang dalam sebuah jaringan yang kokoh, dari tingkat primer hingga sekunder, yang berpuncak pada Zen Noh sebagai ferederasi koperasi pertanian di tingkat nasional. Dengan perputaran omset mencapai 63.449 dolar AS, atau Rp 583,73 triliun) pertahun, saat ini Zen Noh menem­pati urutan tertinggi dalam ICA Global 300, yang dirilis International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) pada Oktober 2007 lalu.

Zen Noh berdiri pada 30 Maret 1972, hasil penggabungan dua sekunder koperasi pertanian level nasional, yaitu Zenkoren (yang ber­gerak dalam pengadaan kebutuhan pertanian) dan Zenhanren (bergerak di bidang pemasaran pro­duk pertanian). Kedua sekunder ko­perasi ini berdiri pada 1948.

Secara keseluruhan, Zen Noh menghimpun 1.173 koperasi pertanian, 1.010 di antaranya merupakan primer koperasi pertanian. Sisanya merupakan sekunder koperasi pertanian tingkat provinsi, federasi kope­rasi lain yang terkait dengan bidang pertanian dan peternakan. Hampir semua kebutuh­an petani Jepang, dipenuhi melalui koperasi (umumnya disebut JA atau Nohkyo). Mulai dari penga­daan berbagai peralatan dan input pertanian, permodalan, sampai pe­masaran produk pertanian. Bahkan, kebutuhan barang sehari-hari pun, diperoleh lewat koperasi.

Dengan jaringannya, koperasi pertanian Jepang menangani sektor pertanian dari hulu sampai hilir, termasuk sektor pendukungnya se­per­ti keuangan dan asuransi. Pada awalnya, tanaman pertanian yang menjadi perhatian adalah padi. Total produksi beras yang dihasilkan, rata-rata mencapai 1,58 juta ton per tahun.

Namun, pada perkembangan selanjutnya, koperasi juga mengarahkan petani untuk melakukan diversivikasi tanaman. Hal ini dilakukan agar tidak terjadi over supply beras sehingga harganya jatuh. Koperasi selalu mengupayakan agar harga setiap komoditi di tingkat petani tetap tinggi, sesuai dengan standar hidup di Jepang, yang termasuk paling tinggi di dunia.

Tidak seperti negara berkembang yang pada umumnya mengor­bankan sektor pertanian untuk membangun industri, yaitu de­ngan memperkecil nilai tukar hasil pertanian di hadapan barang produk industri, di Jepang nilai tukar ke­duanya selalu diusahakan setara. Dengan begitu, tingkat kesejahtera­an para petani, tidak ketinggalan dengan masyarakat yang bekerja di sektor industri.

Strategi tersebut, bukan tanpa risiko. Semula, Jepang memang bisa menerapkan kebijakan untuk mela­rang impor komoditi pertanian yang banyak dihasilkan petaninya, kendati harganya jauh lebih mahal di ban­ding pasar dunia. Namun, pada 1993, Jepang dipaksa membuka keran impor, melalui Kese­pakatan Umum tentang Tarif dan Perdagangan (GATT). Berdasarkan kesepakatan itu, mulai 1995 Jepang membuka impor beras, mes­kipun dibatasi hanya 4 persen dari kebutuhan beras dalam negeri. Memasuki tahun 2000, batasan itu diberbesar menjadi 4,8 persen.

Namun, Pemerintah Jepang te­tap melindungi petaninya, antara lain dengan menetapkan bea masuk cukup tinggi, di samping tetap memberikan subsidi pada input pertanian. Melalui koperasi, peta­ni Jepang memang mempunyai lobi yang kuat di pemerintahan. Bahkan di Partai Demokrat Libe­ral (LDP) yang merupakan partai besar, banyak orang koperasi yang berkiprah. Mereka mampu meyakinkan pemerintah, bahwa membatasi impor komoditi pertanian dalam jangka panjang bakal menumbulkan ketergantung­an yang bisa berakibat fatal. Dalam jangka pendek, melindungi pertanian di dalam negeri juga terkait de­ngan stabilitas politik nasional.

Lantas, apakah pertanian Jepang menjadi pasif berlindung di balik proteksi pemerintah? Tentu saja, tidak. Koperasi pertanian Jepang aktif melakukan kampanye yang mengu­sung tema “Produk Lokal untuk Kon­sumen Lokal”. Upaya untuk menjaga loyalitas penduduk Jepang pada produk pertanian dalam negeri ini, tidaklah semata-mata mengandalkan unsur emosional, tapi juga rasional.

Kendati harganya relatif lebih tinggi, koperasi pertanian menjamin bahwa seluruh komoditi pertanian yang dihasilkan anggotanya, memenuhi standar higienis tinggi. De­ngan label dengan system bar-code di setiap kemasan pertanian yang dibeli di toko koperasi, konsu­men dengan jelas mengetahui siapa petani yang menanam produk yang mereka beli. Maka, jika terjadi se­suatu, komplain lebih mudah di lakukan. Agar produk pertanian itu bisa dijual lebih murah, kope­rasi membangun jaringan toko sendiri, sehingga bisa memotong jalur distribusi.

Perkembangan bisnis setiap kope­rasi pertanian di Jepang, pada gilirannya, mendorong Zen Noh untuk terus melebarkan sayap bisnisnya, dengan jaringan yang tersebar di 26 negara, termasuk Indonesia, dan memiliki afiliasi dengan 249 perusahaan. Jumlah karyawannya mencapai 12,5 ribu orang lebih.

Sumber: Majalah-pip.com 2008

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Reformasi Pertanian di Jepang

Pada bulan April 2007, Gugus Tugas Promosi Kebijakan Pangan, Pertanian dan Wilayah Pedesaan yang dipimpin oleh Perdana Menteri telah mengadopsi paket kebijakan yang berorientasi pada sasaran yang disesuaikan dengan sasaran kebijakan kabinet sektor pertanian, yakni:

1) untuk memanfaatkan secara penuh kapasitas produksi yang berpotensi pada bidang pertanian dan untuk mengembangkan pertanian sebagai industri penting yang strategis di abad 21;

2) untuk memenuhi permintaan produk yang berkwalitas tinggi dan permintaan keamanan pangan bagi konsumen, dan untuk melaksanakan rencana yang terdiri dari (i) reformasi agraria yang dikonsentrasikan pada lahan pertanian petani utama dalam rangka memperkuat struktur pertanian Jepang dan (ii) penetapan Strategi Kementerian Pertanian, Kehutanan dan Perikanan dalam pencegahan Global Warming.

Respon Jepang terhadap melambungnya harga produk pertanian di dunia dan terhadap menurunnya swasembada pangan, pada bulan Mei 2008 Gugus Tugas Promosi Kebijakan Pangan, Pertanian dan Wilayah Pedesaan yang dipimpin oleh Perdana Menteri telah mengadopsi aksi dan tindakan nyata yang harus dikembangkan bukan hanya oleh Kementerian Pertanian, Kehutanan dan Perikanan tetapi juga oleh Jepang secara menyeluruh. Program-programnya meliputi:

1) mengembangkan dan mempopulerkan produk-produk tepung beras, produksi pakan ternak dari sawah dan meningkatkan swasembada pakan ternak untuk memperkuat kapasitas suplai makanan domestik;

2) menambahkan informasi yang benar pada label kemasan makanan untuk meningkatkan kepercayaan konsumen;

3) mengembangkan program stabilisasi menejemen pertanian yang ditujukan kepada Petani Utama;

4) membangun suatu sistem dimana perusahaan dan masyarakat yang berasal dari bidang yang beranekaragam dapat memasuki sektor pertanian;

5) memanfaatkan kembali lahan “tidur”;

6) meningkatkan kerjasama di antara petani, industri makanan lokal dan perusahaan pengecer lokal guna revitalisasi wilayah pedesaan.

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Kebijakan Produksi Padi di Jepang

Kementerian Pertanian, Kehutanan dan Perikanan Jepang memberikan kesempatan kepada petani padi untuk ikut serta dalam program penurunan produksi padi, yang merupakan kebalikan dari kebijakan produksi padi selama ini, kata sumber dari Kementerian tersebut pada hari Selasa (3 Pebruari 2009).

Dengan sistem ini, hanya para petani yang ikut serta dalam usaha penurunan produksi padi yang sejalan dengan kebijakan pemerintah diberikan tunjangan, kata sumber tersebut.

Belum diketahui apakah koperasi pertanian dan petani padi yang telah mematuhi kebijakan pemerintah dalam pengurangan tanaman pangan selama bertahun-tahun akan menentang perubahan kebijakan ini.

Langkah ini dapat memaksa industri padi – yang telah diproteksi selama beberapa dekade – secara drastis berubah menuju liberalisasi. Selama ini pemerintah telah membantu petani padi dengan membeli gabah ketika harga jatuh.

Para petani yang patuh dengan kebijakan penurunan produksi padi ini biasanya menjual hasil panenannya melalui koperasi. Apabila mereka diberikan pilihan untuk mengurangi penanaman padi, komisi penjualan yang diterima koperasi bisa menurun.

Kementerian Pertanian, Kehutanan dan Perikanan bertujuan maju ke depan dengan perubahan kebijakan tersebut sebagai pilar utama dalam reformasi pertanian yang diharapkan pada tahun fiskal 2010, kata sumber tersebut.

Menteri Pertanian Shigeru Ishiba telah mengatakan bahwa kebijakan padi nasional harus dirubah karena beberapa petani padi yang tidak patuh terhadap kebijakan pengurangan produksi padi ini masih memperoleh keuntungan dari kebijakan bantuan harga dari pemerintah.

“Kami akan melakukan kajian semua peraturan yang memungkinkan (untuk penggantian sistem)” kata Ishiba di Konperensi press.

Jika kebijakan ini diterapkan, petani yang memilih untuk tidak turut serta dalam pengurangan produksi padinya akan lebih bebas dalam melakukan usaha taninya dan akan dapat memproduksi varietas padi yang terkenal sesuai dengan kondisi pasar. Akan tetapi bisa juga mereka akan menderita apabila harga beras jatuh tajam karena mereka tidak memperoleh bantuan finansial dari Pemerintah.

Sebuah badan yang anggotanya terdiri dari delegasi organisasi pertanian dan para pakar pertanian akan dibentuk guna membuat perencanaan yang menentukan, kata sumber tersebut.

Dengan kebijakan ini, Pemerintah mengarahkan para petani untuk mengurangi penanaman padinya dan diganti ditanami dengan tanaman pangan lain.

Sumber: Japan Times 3 Pebruari 2009

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JFIR's Recommendation for Japan's Strategy for its Agriculture in the Globalized World

The Policy Council of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) has completed its one year long deliberation on its Policy Recommendation on the theme of “Japan’s Strategy for its Agriculture in the Globalized World”. Following its presentation of the recommendations, signed by the 99 members of the Council, to Prime Ministers Taro Aso, the Policy Council of JFIR held a Press Conference to announce its publication of the recommendations on January 2009 in Tokyo. The initial briefing was conducted in Japanese by Mr. Ito Kenichi President of JFIR and Prof. Honma Masayoshi Head of the Task Force for the Recommendations.

The 31st Policy recommendations of The Policy Council, The Japan Forum on International Relations.


I. Key Concepts to Change the Structure of Japan’s Agriculture

1. Regard Japanese Agriculture as Growing Industry and Make it Target the world markets.
2. Establish 21st-Century Food Production Base Area to Ensure a Stable Food Supply.
3. Integrate Plans for Farmland Use within Plans for the Effective Use of the Total National Land Base.
4. Use Agriculture to Revitalize Local Economies.
5. Abolish Policies that Reduce Rice Acreage.
6. Implement Food Security Policy from Two Perspectives: a Stable, Daily Supply of Food, and a Possible Severe Food Shortage due to Emergency Conditions in Japan.
7. Open Japan’s Agriculture to the World.

II. Mid- to Long-Term Measures

8. Assemble 1.5 Million hectares of Land into 10,000 Core Farms in Food Production Base Areas Measuring about 100 hectares each.
9. Designate the Food Production Base Areas as Special Economic Zones for Deregulated Farming.
10. Establish Financing Policies to Encourage Production, and Forgive the Loans of Highly Effective Farm Managers.
11. Introduce Land Use Planning that Emphasizes Optimal Use of Farm Land and the Surrounding Environment.
12. Compile Road Maps Showing a move toward Eliminating Rice Production Quotas and Increasing Annual Rice Production to 12 million tons.
13. Establish with in the Prime Minister’s Office a Pan-Ministerial Organization Responsible for the Economic Security of the Japanese People.
14. Use Japan’s Agricultural Technologies to Help Eliminate Food Problems in the World.

III. Key Measures for Urgent Needs

15. Assemble Large Blocks of Farmland Rapidly, by Helping Farmers Transfer Ownership of Their Land by Retiring Early.
16. Develop Agriculture-Commerce-Industry Partnerships to Create New Employment Opportunities in Farming Villages.
17. Establish Tax- and Donation-based Mechanisms to support the Employment of Retirees and the Establishment of Multifunctional farming.
18. Assist in the Training of Professionals, Especially Young Professionals, Who Will Promote Agricultural Exports.
19. Establish a Market for Transfer of Production Quotas, as an Essential Step toward Eliminating Rice Acreage Reduction Measures.
20. Accept 50,000 Foreign Farmlands under a Government-regulated Program.
21. Show Leadership in Guiding WTO Agricultural Negotiation to a successful Conclusion.

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Hailing Prime Minister Aso's Stance towards China

by YUSHITA Hiroyuki,

Visiting Professor of Kyorin University

Newly-elected Prime Minister Aso Taro held bilateral talks respectively with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and South Korean President Lee Myung-bank in October on the occasion of his attendance at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit in Beijing, thereby kicking off his summit-level diplomacy with neighboring Asian countries. After the repeated changes of Prime Minister in Japan, both national and international attention was focused on how the Japanese new leader works out his policies towards China and South Korea. To our delight, during these meetings, the basic outline for building solid relationships and cooperation was confirmed among those heads of government, and the implementation of reciprocal visits and a frequent exchange of views on the telephone were also agreed upon between Japan and South Korea. Worthy of special note concerning Japan's relations with China was Mr. Aso's remarks at the Reception to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China. Reading the press coverage of his remarks, I fully sympathized with him in the following three points.

The first point is concerning Mr. Aso's basic understanding of the nature of Japan-China relations. He stated, "It is not easy to name other countries as important to Japan as China. The essence of Japan-China bilateral relations is that our two countries are 'mutually indispensable to each other.' Japan and China are neighbors in perpetuity, that is, 'neighbors that cannot relocate.' Japan and China should make a concerted effort and grow together in order to realize an Asia that is both open and increasingly vibrant."

The second point is about Mr. Aso's basic perception of the status quo of Japan-China relations. He stated, "When we look at public opinion surveys regarding Japan-China relations, I cannot help feeling a touch of concern. In both Japan and China, the percentage of people holding at least some degree of positive feelings towards the other country does not reach even 30%. Even if we hold different views, we should always have a correct understanding of what the other is thinking. The important thing is to promote dialogue and exchanges at every possible level, thereby deepening our mutual understanding on broader basis."

The last point is about Mr. Aso's basic posture on the bilateral relations. He said, "We should not refrain from doing things in the name of 'friendship' between Japan and China. Rather, active cooperation through sound competition will constitute a true 'mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.' There are a host of issues that Japan and China should engage in cooperatively, proactively sending a message from Asia to the world. We are looking towards the same future. We can have even more confidence in 'the latent power and vitality' of the Japan-China bilateral relationship."

Witnessing the dramatic rise of China, some Japanese have increased their wariness or strengthened their alarmist attitudes towards China. They center on such questions as "what will become of China" or "what China is trying to do." However, diplomacy or foreign relations are, by nature, processes on interactive basis; one nation cannot stand independent of other nations' actions. That is to say, China might transform itself according to the actions taken by Japan or the U.S. It is imperative, therefore, that Japan, instead of being passively gripped by anxiety or wariness, should enhance mutual understanding with China, thereby forging close ties with it, while the Japan-U.S. alliance remains the axis of Japan's foreign policy. Interestingly enough, France and Germany today go hand-in-hand taking the lead in advancing European integration; their present amity is startlingly contrasted to their hostile relationship in the past, exemplified by such instances as Franco-German War, World War I and World War II. I really hope to see Prime Minister Aso's basic posture on Japan-China relations will sooner or later take a concrete shape.

Source: GFJ Commentary, 20 November, 2008

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Japanese Rice Trade Policy Overview

By Steve Moody
Japanese Department, Brigham Young University

Claiming a need for self-sufficiency stable supply, Japan has a long history of heavy protectionism in the rice sector. Despite pressures from virtually every single trading partner Japan deals with, they have maintained a rigidly stubborn stance opposing foreign imports of rice. At the peak of such protectionist policies in 1985, Japan records that imports of rice from the US barely totaled .2% of total domestic consumption. In fact, until very recently, Japan has been closed to virtually all rice imports.

Japan’s aggressive protectionist stance began with strict quantitative limitations on imports shortly after World War II. These policies continued to be modified to further restrict trade until the mid 1980’s when, due to pressure from many trading partners—particularly the US—the country began to grudgingly open its borders to foreign rice. For example, in 1986 California rice producers filed a petition to the US government under section 301, claiming that Japan’s policies caused significant injury to their industry. At this time, Japan was providing a $2,200-per-metric-ton subsidy to Japanese domestic producers. This subsidy was as much as ten times the world price (Unites States House of Representatives, 1986). Following this complaint and many similar, the US began to put heavy pressure on Japan to open its market. Although slow to respond initially, due to this and other negotiations, Japan has begun to liberalize its market.

However, despite this gradual reduction of tariffs, subsidies, and other policies, current trade barriers in Japan are still very prevalent. Recently, Japan has relied most heavily on domestic subsidies, although quota and tariff policies are also in effect. The most recent information available indicates that the Japanese government directly subsidizes rice production by as much as $1.82 billion (206 billion yen) (Fukuda, Dyck, & Stout, 2003).

Japanese subsidies come via a number of different government programs. The most direct subsidy program, called the Japanese Rice Farming Income Stabilization Program, was implemented in 1998. The Income Stabilization Program allows for rice farmers to claim payments equal to the difference of domestic rice prices and a predetermined standard, should the market price fall. In 1999, such payments totaled $815 million (92.7 billion yen). On a per-hectare basis, Japan subsidizes an incredible $9,600 more than the United States. The Office of the Unites States Trade Representative (USTR) reports that, “. . . because of high tariffs and other barriers to trade, Japan's rice producers are very insulated from the open market” (2003). Such programs enable inefficient Japanese rice producers to continue to produce rice and charge a much higher price to the domestic consumers than the world price, greatly reducing the net social welfare. This effect will be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

With total direct subsidies, as well as more indirect programs designed to enhance rice farmer competitiveness and drive up domestic process, taxpayers spent an estimated $2.8 billion in support of just the rice industry in 1999 alone (Fukuda et al., 2003). On a per-hectare of production basis, Japan’s subsidy is enormous, over 12 times that of the US and EU subsidies combined. A more detailed breakdown of subsidy programs is shown in Table 1.

Table 1 – Japanese Subsidy Details for Rice Production in 1999

Subsidy Program : Million US$ (Billion ¥)

Rice Farming Income Stabilization Program : 815 (92.7)
Insurance premium payments : 231 (24.2)
Interest payments : 315 (35.8)
Extension services : 40 (4.6)
Investments in farm capital : 432 (49.1)

Total : 1.82 (206.4)

Per-Hectare Expenditure

Country : US$ (¥ )

Japan : 9,706 (1,016,000)
United States : 117 (12,000)
European Union : 676 (70,800)

Sources: Fukuda et al., 2003; USTR, 2003

Beyond subsidy programs, Japan also has a myriad of border policies in relation to the rice industry. Japan currently has a tariff of 150 yen per kilogram imposed on all rice as it crosses the border. Additionally, rice imports are subject to a quota of 682,000 tons, above which imports are taxed with a tariff of 341 yen per kilogram. Statistics show that this tariff rate effectively prohibits all imports above the quota (Fukuda, et al., 2003). Without exception, every policy has been designed to protect a comparatively disadvantaged domestic industry. Figure 1 illustrates the nominal rate of protection in the Japanese rice sector due to high tariff levels.

Domestic Welfare Effects

The Japanese have a culture deeply rooted in traditional behavioral models. Japanese feel an intense sense of obligation to keep things stable and are thus very resistant to change. These attitudes are manifest in their policies (Yoshimura & Anderson, 1997).

However, in this case it is clear that resisting change—refusing to allow more foreign rice into the domestic economy—is not benefiting the Japanese economy at all. While admittedly producers receive some benefit from protection, with prices continuing to climb, the welfare loss to consumers is tremendous. The result is the country as a whole loses. Even several Japanese economists and politicians have finally admitted the poor stance of their policies and have suggested that heavy rice protection is no longer the answer (United States Senate, 1986).

The purpose of Japan’s protectionist policies is to drive domestic prices up and provide producers with higher incomes. However, this welfare gain is immediately lost by the fact the consumers must pay higher prices. Thus the policies do not increase welfare, but simply divert income from producers to consumers.

Additionally, due to the fact that rice is a main stable in the Japanese diet, empirical research indicates that consumer demand for rice is inelastic—as prices increase, demand is not likely to change very much (Fukuda et al., 2003). Therefore raising the domestic price of rice imposes a severe burden on consumers.

In 2000 consumers spent over 1% of their income ($638 per individual) to cover the merely the difference between domestic and world rice process. This problem directly affects an individual when he goes shopping at the local market. Current data shows that Japanese consumers pay roughly $2.63 per kilogram compared to the US price of $.20 per kilogram (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [MAFF], 2001).

Other welfare losses are shouldered by the government, which then taxes consumers and imposes further welfare losses. One example of such expenditures is storage costs. As indicated previously, the government has agreed to pay the difference to producers when the domestic price falls below a predetermined standard. It accomplishes this buy buying surplus rice stocks at the predetermined price. The government has then chosen to store the rice rather than export it, and this then requires increased taxes to provide for the storage facilities.

Figure 2 illustrates a few of these effects. Note that when consumption exceeds production, storage volumes and the associated expenses increase. Also interesting to note is the import level of nearly zero until 1993. The lack of imports can be taken as evidence of the welfare loss experienced by consumers.

International Welfare Effects

The negative effects of Japan’s rice protection are not limited to the domestic market alone. Virtually every economy involved in rice trading has felt adverse effects from the Japanese policies. As a specific case study, this report will look the welfare effects felt by Burma, a small rice-exporting country in Southeast Asia.

Burma entered the rice market in the late 1920’s, producing just under half of the quantity of Japanese production at the time. Like Japan, traditionally Burma has not been lacked protectionist tendencies. Until recent decades, privately-owned firms were not allowed to export rice at all. However, the Burmese government realized the effects and in an effort to encourage expansion of its relatively small rice industry has begun to move toward more liberal policies (Siok-Hwa & Lumpur, 1968).

However, this move toward trade liberalization has been complicated by the aggressive protectionist policies still in place in developed countries such as Japan (Kazmin, 2004). Being geographically close and also a large consumer of rice, Japan is a natural export target for Burmese producers. However, high tariffs and vast array of protectionist policies have severely limited Burma’s ability to trade. As shown in Table 2, over the past several years, Burma’s export volume of rice has significantly increased. A major portion of this increase has been going to Japan. At this same time, Japan has been gradually reducing trade barriers. This trend suggests that Japan’s limitations on imports have played an influential role in limiting past exports of Burmese rice and thus imposing a welfare loss on the country’s producers (United States Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2002).

Table 2 – Burmese Rice Export Volume (thousands of metric tons)

1997 : 15

1998 : 94

1999 : 57

2000 : 159

2001 : 250

2002 : 750

Source: USDA 2002

From a theoretical standpoint, the trade pattern between Burma and Japan suggest that Burma has a comparative advantage in the rice industry. Burma tends to export and Japan tends to import. When the specific data is considered, it becomes clear that Burma does indeed have a comparative advantage over Japan in rice production. Japan is one of the highest cost rice producers in the world, requiring as much as $12,000 to produce one hectare of rice. Burma, on the other hand, enjoys some of the lowest production costs, around $500 per hectare (Yap, 1991).

As a normative argument, the trends suggest that global welfare is better off by allowing Burma to specialize in rice production and export. On the other hand, Japan should use its resources to specialize in another sector where it can produce efficiently, for in rice, it is rather inefficient. This pattern is occurring, but the ridiculous degree of protectionism demonstrated by the Japanese government limits the extent. The result is a set of policies that does not allow the world to enjoy an optimal level of efficiency.

Burma, although a more efficient producer of rice, is unable to produce at its free-trade equilibrium. Additionally, Burmese producers must pay significant costs to get their rice across the Japanese border. These distortions yield a negative net welfare effect on the Japanese, Burmese, and world economies.

Econometric studies have indicated that Japan has the ability to influence market prices in rice, but Burma behaves more like a price-taker (Barker, Herdt, & Rose, 1985). Thus Burma is subject in part to the whims of the Japanese government. Qualitatively, the isolation of the Japanese economy in the rice sector decreases the demand that Burmese producers face. With lower demand than free trade would otherwise allow, Burmese producers are unable to produce as much and are stuck with higher production costs. Rice demand in the small Burmese economy is saturated and if Burmese producers wish to expand production, they must try and sell in foreign markets. The Japanese market exhibits severely inflated prices due to tariffs and other restrictions and thus the growth of the otherwise competitive Burmese rice industry is greatly hindered by the Japanese restrictions which are destroying the possibility of trade between the two economies (Coyle, 1981).

A comparison of the costs of rice production, as well as other indicators in the two economies make it is obvious that Burma is the more efficient producer of the rice and Japanese resources would be better spent elsewhere. It can also be seen that Japanese protectionism is causing unnecessary costs on everyone else participating in the market (Yap, 1981).

Benefits of Trade Liberalization

Clearly, the best course of action, when considering world welfare, is to eliminate all trade barriers. Senator Pete Wilson gave his opinion to the US Congress that Japanese protectionism harms international rice trade. Total liberalization would benefit all involved, not just the United States. He stated that “the elimination of Japan’s unfair import ban would also benefit rice growers in Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, and other developing countries” (United States House of Representatives, 1986).

Burma, as well as other small, developing countries, are typically the recipients of the greatest injury from trade barriers. The rice industry in Burma is still small and is struggling to get a firm hold in international markets. However, Japan’s policies drive up domestic prices of the otherwise low-priced Burmese rice. Because Burma’s costs of producing rice are so much lower than Japan’s, Burma has a comparative advantage in its production. Trade barriers distort this advantage.

Burmese producers are faced with high costs when selling their stocks to Japanese consumers. These costs come primarily from the enormous tariffs that must be paid as the rice crosses the border. The result: Burmese producers are not able to sell as much rice as they would otherwise. Japanese consumers also lose out by being forced to pay much higher prices than they would with international free trade.

In the event that the trade between the two countries was to be completely liberalized, the benefits would be abundant. Burmese producers would have a much larger consumer base to sell to and the elimination of trade barriers would allow them to produce more rice much more efficiently than the Japanese. Japanese consumers would likewise benefit from the increased supply and subsequent decline in prices.

WTO Meetings in Cancun

The issue of Japan’s rice protectionism proved to be a major obstacle up during the World Trade Organization negations in Cancun. In fact, it was one of the primary contributors to destroying negotiations completely. Japan, along with several other Asian countries, pressed very hard for exceptions allowing them to impose even more barriers on trade than the current policies. They surrounded this stance in an argument saying it is necessary for the survival of the domestic rice industry (Reuters, 2003). This is a sensible argument when view the situation from the perspective of the Japanese rice producers. As demonstrated earlier, the Japanese rice producers are not efficient at all and produce rice at a very high cost. In order for them to survive against low-cost producers—such as Burma—they must protect the industry.

Unfortunately, Japanese producers represent only a small fraction of the world population. Their stance fails to take into account the other welfare effects imposed on other players in the world economy. The other countries were fighting to get Japan to open its borders to rice. They argued that doing so will not only improve the industries abroad, but will also allow rice production to move to producers who are the most efficient. In the long run, this is better for everyone involved.

Japan’s stubborn stance seemed to be more political than economic. When one takes a good look at the statistic presented in the report, it should be quite clear that trade liberalization is the best policy. However, rice farmers provide votes and Japanese politicians depend on these votes for their survival. Although they did make a few minor compromises, Japan continued to refuse to reduce its trade restrictions. This was a major factor in the breakdown of negotiations (Azuma, 2001).

Conclusion

Thus it is easy to see that rice trade in Japan—and the Orient in general—is a very sensitive topic to all involved. The powerful countries, such as Japan, seem to be the highest-cost producers and are experiencing a comparative disadvantage. The low-cost producers, such as Burma, are the ones who should be producing the bulk of product. The interesting thing is that if Japan was to really act in its own self-interest, considering the welfare imposed on the country as a whole, it would open its borders to trade. Such a move would, in the long run, increase Japan’s domestic welfare, and the welfare of all of its trade partners. Japanese consumers would enjoy the price reductions and use the extra money to build up other sectors in the struggling economy. However, the politicians are bowing to the wishes of a powerful special interest groups—rice farmers—and are refusing to liberalize. There remains some hope, however, as Japan’s borders are more open now than they have been in the past. But unfortunately for the Asian rice consumer, it will likely be a long road until free trade will become the rule, not the exception.

References:

• Azuma, Yasushi. (2001, September). WTO Failure Relief for Japan. Japan Today.
• Barker, Randolph, Herdt, Robert W., & Rose, Beth. (1985). The Rice Economy of Asia. Washington D.C.
• Coyle, William T. (1981). Japan’s Rice Policy. Foreign Agricultural Economic Report, Number 164. Washington D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture
• Foreign Agricultural Service. (2002). Burma: Rice Situation Update. www.fas.usda.gov
• Fukuda, Hisao, Dyck, John & Stout, Jim. (2003). Rice Sector Policies in Japan. Electronic Outlook Report from the Economic Research Service. United States Department of Agriculture. www.erc.usda.gov
• Harvey, David. (2002). Japanese Farm Policy. www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/david.harvey
• Hayami, Yujiro & Yoshihisa, Godo. (1995). Economics and Politics of Rice Policy in Japan: A Perspective on the Uruguay Round. Working Paper Series, Number 5341. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Kazmin, Amy. (2004, February). Burma’s Rice Policy Chaos Sows Economic Seeds of Doubt. Financial Times. www.burmalibrary.org
• Nagai, Shinya & Takahashi, Kunio. (1996). 1194-95 Annual Abstracts of Official Reports and Statistics of the Japanese Government. White Papers of Japan. Tokyo.
• Office of the United States Trade Representative. (2003). Farm Policies in the U.S., EU, and Japan. Trade Facts. www.ustrade-wto.gov
• Rae, Allan & Josling, Timothy. (2001). Processed Food Trade and Developing Countries: Protection and Trade Reform. NZ Trade Consortium Working Paper Series, Number 15. Wellington: The NZ Institute of Economic Research, Inc
• Reuters. (2001, September). WTO on a Sticky Wicket Against Japan’s Rice Bowlers. The Age. theage.com.au
• Siok-Hwa, Cheng & Lumpur, Kuala. (1968). The Rice Industry of Burma 1852~1940. Singapore: University of Malaya Press.
• United States Department of Agriculture. (2001, February). 2001/02 Global Wheat and Course Grain Trade Diverge. Grain: World Markets and Trade. www.fas.usda.gov
• United States House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture. (1986). Review of Japan’s Policy Concerning the Importation of Rice (Serial No. 99-49). Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
• United States Senate, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. (1986). U.S.-Japan Rice Trade (Serial Number 99-1051). Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
• Yap, C.L. (1991). A Comparison of the Cost of Producing Rice in Selected Countries. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Economic Social Development Paper, Number 101.
• Yoshimura, Noboru & Anderson, Philip. (1997). Inside the Kaisha. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Source : Japan-101 Information resource

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For the Agriculture with Security, Safety, Low Price and Stability

By Iwakuni Tetsundo
Member of the House of Representatives (Democratic Party of Japan)

In Japan, farmers have distrust of agricultural policies of the government and are faced with a serious shortage of successors. Foreign countries are dissatisfied with the Japanese attitude towards market liberalization. Consumers are concerned about various problems including the quality of foreign foods. Therefore serious debate for the revitalization of agriculture has been taking place in the Diet as well as local assemblies. Now it is time for everyone to frankly discuss the future direction of Japanese agriculture with a new idea, regardless of their positions.

First of all, the separation of ownership and management of farmlands should be promoted boldly. It is expected to contribute to bridging the gap between "the late elderly" who have farmlands but cannot cultivate them and "middle-aged and young farmers" who do not own farmlands despite their high motivations. For such a purpose, the Japanese government should purchase farmlands by issuing zero-coupon "farmland bond" or "paper money" and delegate management functions to prefectures and cities. Those public farmlands should be divided into two types, that is, "production farmlands" in flatlands and "farmlands for environmental conservation" in intermediate and mountainous areas. Farmers should be requested to improve their productivity so that they could win competition by themselves while compensation should be provided for farmers in intermediate and mountainous areas who are at a disadvantage in income. Such compensation can be financed by the rent income of farmlands. The selection of "production farmers" and "ecological farmers" needs to be made immediately. It would become possible to secure successors during that process.

In both France and Britain, lands are cultivated in every corner of the country and green farmlands have spread out. It is because they have succeeded in keeping triple set of church, post office, and elementary school. In Germany, there is a contest in which each village competes with each other to make their own village beautiful. Development for preserving a beautiful farm village as cultural heritage has produced a fascinating environment in a rural area, thereby attracting people in urban area who have emotional attachments to a natural environment.

I would like to request the Japanese agricultural policy to be changed so that farmers could retain successors and engage in agriculture without anxiety. One of the common desires of farmers and consumers is the establishment of self-sufficient system from an international standpoint, not focusing on domestic self-sufficiency. It should include consumer-conscious policies and indirect self-sufficient system as an option. For the overseas agricultural production, Japan should promote cooperation with foreign countries by providing its agricultural skills and funds, if the narrowness of lands is really a problem for Japan. Recently I heard the story that New Zealand and Iwate Prefecture of Japan have started the joint production of the same food brand by seasonally switching the production between the southern hemisphere and the northern hemisphere.

Highly-motivated young Japanese farmers should cooperate with Southeast Asia and some regions of China and manage agricultural production there by the Japanese skills. Such a cooperative framework will generate a sense of security among people because they can eat foods produced by the Japanese. I believe that it is a mutually beneficial idea. Now is a starting point of the new history of Japanese agriculture. We should consider the re-establishment of agriculture which aims at "security," "safety," "low price," and "stability."

Source: The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) E-Letter, 15 September 2008, Vol. 1, No. 6

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Gambaran Skilas Ekonomi Jepang

Ekonomi pasar bebas dan industri Jepang merupakan ketiga terbesar di dunia setelah Amerika Serikat dan Tiongkok dilihat dari segi paritas daya beli internasional. Ekonominya sangat efisien dan bersaing dalam area yang berhubungan dengan perdagangan internasional, tapi produktivitas lebih rendah di bidang agriklutur, distribusi, dan pelayanan.

Kerjasama di antara pemerintahan dan perindustrian, etika kerja yang sehat, penguasaan teknologi, penekanan terhadap pendidikan dan alokasi yang kecil untuk pertahanan (1% dari PDB) merupakan antara faktor-faktor yang memungkinkan Jepang berkembang pesat sehingga menjadi salah satu negara yang setanding dengan Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa dari segi penguasaan ekonomi.

Ciri-ciri khas ekonomi Jepang di antaranya adalah kerja sama yang erat di antara perusahaan yang bergerak di bidang pengilangan, perbekalan, pengedaran, dan bank (kelompok kerja sama ini disebut keiretsu); negosiasi upah antara perusahaan swasta dengan serikat buruh (shunto); hubungan baik dengan birokrasi pemerintahan, dan jaminan karir sepanjang hayat (shushin koyo) untuk hampir sepertiga tenaga kerja di kota, dan jaminan kontrak kerja bagi buruh. Perusahaan kecil dan sederhana, wanita, dan pekerja asing biasanya tidak mempunyai fasilitas seperti itu. Bagaimanapun, kebanyakan ciri tersebut semakin terkikis, dan keadaan ekonomi kini sedang berhadapan dengan stagnasi.

Perindustrian merupakan sektor ekonomi yang paling utama buat Jepang yang amat bergantung pada impor bahan mentah dan minyak. Pertanian yang merupakan sektor ekonomi yang kecil mempunyai subsidi yang tinggi dan merupakan satu sektor yang dilindungi.

Ini dapat dilihat dengan jelas pada pertanian yang melibatkan beras. Beras yang diimpor dikenakan pajak sebanyak 490% dan pemerintahan hanya membolehkan kuota sebanyak 3% jumlah beras yang ada di pasaran beras. Selain melindungi pasaran beras, Jepang juga mengadakan usaha untuk menciptakan buah-buahan dan sayur-sayuran yang berkualitas tinggi dan enak namun mahal. Biasanya Jepang mampu menampung keperluan beras rakyatnya sendiri (kecuali beras yang dipakai untuk membuat makanan ringan dan makanan olahan), namun negara ini perlu mengimpor kira-kira 50% kebutuhan serealia dan makanan ternak.

Jepang mempunyai salah satu industri perikanan yang terbesar di dunia yang mencakup hampir 15% penangkapan ikan seluruh dunia, mendorong pada dugaan bahwa perikanan Jepang sedang mengakibatkan jumlah ikan di laut yang berkurang secara drastis, khususnya ikan tuna.

Secara keseluruhan, selama tiga dekade, pertumbuhan ekonomi sebenarnya amat mengagumkan: rata-rata 10% pada dekade 1960-an, rata-rata 5% pada 1970-an, dan rata-rata 4% pada 1980-an. Pertumbuhan ini namun mulai melesu pada dekade 1990-an, terutamanya disebabkan dampak sampingan perburuhan secara berlebihan selepas tahun 1980-an dan dasar-dasar ekonomi pengurangan inflasi yang bertujuan membebaskan diri dari kelebihan spekulasi pasaran saham dan harga penjualan tanah. Usaha-usaha pemerintah untuk menghidupkan kembali pertumbuhan ekonomi kurang berhasil dan terus terjepit pada tahun 2000-2001. Pada tahun 2000 GDP Jepang 3,15 trilyun USD, GDP Real growth rate 1,3%, GDP per capita 49,900 USD. Sedangkan GDP berasal dari sektor pertanian 2%, industri 35% dan Jasa 63% (1999).

Pertumbuhan ekonomi Jepang pada kuartal pertama 2008 tumbuh 3,3 persen. Persentase ini muncul lebih cepat dari perkiraan para ekonom, yang disurvei Bloomberg, yang mematok angka 2,5 persen. Keberhasilan Jepang ini disebabkan oleh kegiatan ekspor dan juga bermunculannya pasar-pasar potensial yang baru. Ini membuat atmosfer ekonomi Jepang tertolong dalam menghadapi perlambatan ekonomi AS yang dikhawatirkan akan memengaruhi pertumbuhan ekonomi banyak negara.

PM Junichiro Koizumi mengesahkan atau meluluskan (tetapi adakalanya gagal) undang-undang perburuhan asing dan swastanisasi secara besar-besaran yang dipercaya dapat membantu merangsang kembali ekonomi Jepang. Sejauh ini undang-undang tersebut kelihatan menunjukkan hasil dalam berbagai aspek seperti perburuhan asing, namun sejauh ini belum dapat membantu ekonomi Jepang untuk tumbuh kembali. Perdana Menteri Koizumi berhasil meluluskan rancangan swastanisasi besar termasuk swastanisasi semua kantor pos Jepang.

Kepadatan penduduk yang tinggi dan usia mayoritas penduduk yang semakin tua mengakibatkan penurunan jumlah penduduk. Hal ini mengakibatkan peningkatan biaya pemeliharaan kesehatan yang harus ditanggung pemerintah. Di masa depan, industri robot diperkirakan menjadi kekuatan ekonomi yang amat penting. Sejumlah 410.000 dari 720.000 buah robot yang beroperasi di seluruh dunia berada di Jepang.

Sektor pertanian
Hasil utama pertanian Negara Jepang adalah bahan pangan. Walaupun hanya 16% dari luas daratan di Jepang yang dipergunakan untuk pertanian, namun hasilnya termasuk memuaskan. Besarnya hasil pertanian didukung oleh kesuburan lahan pertaniannya karena tanahnya mengandung abu vulkanis. Di samping itu, penggarapan lahan pertanian dilakukan secara intensif dengan didukung teknologi maju. Hasil pertanian berupa padi, kentang, jagung, gandum, kacang, kedelai, dan teh. Hasil peternakan berupa babi, ayam, telur, sapi dan susu. Sayur-sayuran berupa lobak, kubis, ketimun, tomat, wortel, bayam, dan selada. Sedangkan buah-buahan yang banyak ditanam adalah jeruk dan apel.

Sektor perikanan
Jepang menempati urutan ke-2 di dunia di belakang RRC dalam tonase penangkapan ikan (tahun 1989: 11,9 juta ton), turun pelan-pelan dari 11,1 juta ton pada tahun 1980. Setelah terjadi krisis energi tahun 1973, perikanan laut dalam di Jepang menurun. Pada tahun 1980-an, jumlah tangkapan ikan per tahun rata-rata 2 juta ton. Perikanan lepas pantai 50 % dari penangkapan ikan total negeri itu pada akhir 1980-an meski beberapa kali mengalami kenaikan dan penurunan.
Perikanan pesisir dilakukan dengan perahu kecil, jala, atau teknik campuran terhitung sekitar sepertiga produksi total industri perikanan Jepang, Sementara itu perikanan pesisir laut dengan kapal ukuran menengah terhitung sekitar lebih dari separuh produksi total. Di antara spesies ikan yang ditangkap misalnya: sarden, tuna, kepiting, udang, salmon, dan makerel.
Jepang mempertahankan armada perikanan terbesar di dunia dan terhitung sekitar 15% penangkapan global, memunculkan sejumlah pernyataan bahwa perikanan Jepang sedang menimbulkan pengurangan stok ikan seperti tuna. Jepang juga menebarkan kontroversi dengan mendukung perburuan ikan paus.

Sektor industri
Industri ekspor utama Jepang adalah otomotif, elektronik konsumen (lihat industri elektronik konsumen Jepang), komputer, semikonduktor, besi, dan baja.
Industri penting lain dalam ekonomi Jepang adalah petrokimia, farmasi, bioindustri, galangan kapal, dirgantara, tekstil, dan makanan yang diproses. Industri manufaktur Jepang banyak bergantung pada impor bahan mentah dan BBM.

Sektor pertambangan
Pertambangan adalah industri yang sedang menurun di Jepang sejak tahun 1980-an. Produksi batu bara dalam negeri anjlok dari puncaknya 55 juta ton pada 1960 ke hampir lebih dari 16 juta ton pada 1985, sedangkan impor batu bara naik hingga sekitar 91 juta ton pada 1987. Perusahaan pertambangan batu bara dalam negeri harus bersaing dengan batu bara murah hasil impor dan biaya produksi batu bara dalam negeri yang tinggi. Puncaknya adalah defisit cadangan batu bara pada tahun 1980-an. Pada tahun 1980-an, hampir sekitar 1 juta ton cadangan batu bara Jepang sebagian besar digunakan untuk batu arang. Sebagian besar batu bara yang dikonsumsi Jepang merupakan bahan bakar bagi pembangkit listrik.

Sektor jasa
Sejumlah tiga perempat dari total penghasilan ekonomi Jepang berasal dari sektor jasa. Industri utama sektor jasa di Jepang berupa bank, asuransi, real estat, transportasi, dan telekomunikasi. Mitsubishi UFJ, Mizuho, NTT, TEPCO, Nomura, Mitsubishi Estate, Tokio Marine, Japan Railway, Seven & I, ANA telah menjadi perusahaan besar dunia. Enam keiretsu utama terdiri dari grup Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Mitsui, Dai-Ichi Kangyo, dan Sanwa. Sejumlah 326 perusahaan yang berada dalam daftar Forbes Global 2000 (16,3%) berada di Jepang.

Sumber utama: http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jepang#Sektor_pertanian

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Penetapan Marine Eco-label Japan (MEL Japan)

The Japan Fisheries Association (JFA) melakukan penetapan sistem sertifikasi Jepang untuk hasil-hasil perikanan yang disebut Marine Eco-label Japan, disingkat MEL Japan. JFA merupakan payung 400 organisasi dan perusahaan yang bergerak dalam bidang industri perikanan.

Akhir-akhir ini banyak organisasi di Amerika Serikat dan Masyarakat Eropa telah aktif membuat sertifikat produk perikanan dengan tujuan melindungi sumber daya laut dan lingkungan laut. Di Jepang organisasi perikanan telah mempersyaratkan sertifikat Eco-label, dan beberapa perusahaan ikan telah mempersyaratkan sertifikat Chain of Custody (CoC) untuk usaha pengolahan dan distribusi produk ikan. Dengan semakin meningkatnya kesadaran konsumen terhadap Eco-label, semakin meningkat pula jumlah pengecer dan distributor yang menyukai produk perikanan dengan Eco-label.

Untuk merespon bertambahnya permintaan produk perikanan dengan Eco-label, JFA telah memperkenalkan sistem Jepang dalam Marine Eco-label, yang mengikuti pedoman pengelolaan perikanan dan distribusi produk perikanan seperti yang telah ditetapkan oleh FAO tahun 2005.

Marine Eco-label Japan (MEL Japan) telah ditetapkan di Tokyo pada tanggal 6 Desember 2007. MEL Japan merupakan usaha bersama yang dilakukan oleh para industriawan perikanan, masyarakat ilmuwan, organisasi konservasi, para pengolah dan distributor ikan, konsumen, dan ahli makanan yang komitmen melakukan promosi perikanan Jepang yang berkelanjutan. Hasil akhir dari skema ini yaitu standar sertifikasi dan aturan prosedur yang sedang berlangsung. Skema ini diharapkan dapat diselesaikan dalam waktu dekat. Maka dari itu MEL Japan diharapkan penerimaan pendaftaran sertifikasi dan inspeksi dimulai pada bulan April 2008.

1.Latar Belakang

Dalam rangka menyeimbangkan antara populasi ikan di duania dan permintaan ikan di dunia maka diperlukan usaha untuk melestarikan sumber alam laut sehingga tidak terjadi penangkapan ikan yang berlebihan.

Menurut data Review of the state of world marine fishery Resources FAO, tahun 2005, terdapat 441 stok atau kelompok spesies. Tetapi sekitar 77% stok dunia tersebut telah tereksploitasi penuh, tereksploitasi berlebih, bahkan ada stok yang sudah habis sehingga tiada ruang lagi untuk perluasan usaha. Dalam keadaan demikian ini, ecolabel ikan dan produk perikanan telah dikembangkan terutama di negara-negara barat.

Telah diakui bahwa Jepang sebagai pasar terbesar produk perikanan. Para stakeholder pada industri perikanan dan pengelolaan perikanan di Jepang telah memutuskan untuk proaktif menetapkan skema ecolabel yang akan dapat diterapkan karena sesuai dengan keadaan perikanan di Jepang.

2.Pinsip dasar

a.Promosi konservasi dan penggunaan yang berkelanjutan sumber daya alam laut

MEL Japan bertujuan membuat ketetapan untuk menginformasikan keputusan pembeli yang pilihannya dapat dipercaya mempromosikan dan mendorong penggunaan yang berkelanjutan sumber daya alam perikanan.

b.Pengelolaan bersama-sama

MEL Japan melanjutkan penggunaan keunggulan pengelolaan bersama-sama dimana telah dipraktekkan dalam rangka meyakinkan penggunaan sumber alam yang berkelanjutan dari lingkungan hidup laut di Jepang dan Asia pada zaman kuno. Gagasan pengelolaan bersama-sama ini adalah nelayan bersama-sama berperan aktif baik dalam pengelolaan perikanan maupun perbaikan sumber alam. Pada komunitas penangkap ikan di Jepang, mereka telah mengembangkan gagasan pengelolaan sumber alam perikanan di wilayahnya secara bersama-sama. Menurut mereka kegiatan ini dilakukan dalam rangka menjamin penghidupan komunitasnya. Perikanan berorientasi pengelolaan sumber alam yang efektif dan praktis ini tidak ada bandingannya sedunia, dan telah berkembang dan menyebar luas di Jepang.

Yang melatar belakangi pengembangan pengelolaan bersama-sama ini adalah banyaknya penangkap ikan sekala kecil, perahu penagkap ikan kecil dan target jenis ikan tangkapan beragam. Kerangka kerja ini telah berfungsi membangkitkan semangat kepada nelayan dan mereka yang bekerja dalam bidang perikanan, sebagai pengguna sumber alam laut dalam berperan pengelolaan sumber alam secara sukarela dan secara individu. Nelayan dan pemerintah daerah dan pemerintah pusat bersatu bekerjasama melaksanakan kerangka kerja yang berlaku ini untuk perbaikan sumber alam. Maka dari itu MEL Japan mengaplikasikan secara efektif konsep dari pengelolaan bersama pembuatan sertifikat sebagai suatu cara untuk memudahkan dan memperkuat kerja skema ini.

MEL Japan bertujuan membuat sebuah siklus positif, melalui penerbitan sertifikat ecolabel akan menimbulkan : a) peningkatan perhatian nelayan pada pengelolaan sumber alam; b) peningkatan kerjasama nelayan dengan ilmuwan dan pengelola perikanan; c) peningkatan peran aktif nelayan dalam menyumbangkan pengumpulan data dan kemajuan informasi perikanan.

c.Penerbitan sertifikasi yang ilmiah dan sasarannya

MEL Japan disusun oleh sebuah badan, dewan dan panitia yang terdiri dari perwakilan dari pejabat berwenang dalam pengelolaan perikanan, industri perikanan, organisasi pekerja perikanan, masyarakat ilmuwan, kelompok yang tertarik masalah lingkungan hidup, pengolah ikan, pedagang, pengecer dan juga konsumen, yang sadar akan keadilan terhadap kepentingan semua pihak. MEL Japan juga menjamin sertifikasi yang obyektif dan ilmiah yang dilakukan oleh badan sertifikasi independen yang membentuk tim sertifikasi teridiri dari ilmuwan dan para ahli yang mempunyai pemahaman mendalam tentang perikanan dan lingkungan hidup laut Jepang.

3.Biaya sertifikasi yang diperbolehkan

Agar pola Eco-label ini diterima secara luas, perlu diingat bahwa MEL Japan akan sangat penting dalam menyumbangkan perikanan yang berkelanjutan. MEL Japan akan mengikuti kerangka kerja yang dapat dipraktekan bagi beragam nelayan (skala kecil – besar) yang proaktif terlibat dalam perikanan yang berkelanjutan. Mereka dapat memperoleh seritifikat dengan biaya rendah.

Pada akhirnya, pola MEL Japan dikembangkan menjadi suatu sistem dengan biaya yang murah dan menghindari duplikasi pekerjaan, dengan memanfaatkan data lengkap yang diperoleh melalui pengelolaan yang telah berlaku. Sifat dasar sistem ini adalah non-komersial dan non-profit. Biaya yang ditarik MEL Japan dan badan sertifikasi pihak ketiga rendah sekali hanya untuk biaya pemeliharaan kegiatan ini. Meminimalkan biaya sertifikasi bukan berarti berkompromi dengan persyaratan perikanan yang berkelanjutan. Keberlanjutan pengujian produk perikanan merupakan prasyarat sertifikasi.

4.Sasaran saat ini

Sasaran MEL Japan sementara ini adalah memperluas pengakuan pasar jepang, dengan maksud memperoleh dukungan lebih luas. MEL Japan juga bertujuan untuk merespon kebutuhan pasar asing dalam mempromosikan ekspor makanan seafood Jepang yang berkelanjutan.

(Sumber : Isaribi, no 57 Feb 2008)

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Japan Rice Trade

A. IDENTIFICATION

1. The Issue

This case involves the United States who demanded that Japan
replace all of its import bans and quotas on rice with tariffs, a
policy known as ratification, through the GATT Uruguay Round of
multilateral negotiations. On September 30,1993, the Japanese
government decided to go into the international rice market on a
major scale of the first time in three decades. Because of a cool,
wet summer growing season and an outbreak of blight, Japan faced
its worst rice harvest in the post war period --only 74% of the
amount of the previous period's harvest-- and was forced to
purchase, on an emergency basis, foreign rice in the coming 12
months --two metric ton, to one fifth of yearly consumption-- to
bridge this supply shortfall.

Consequently, Japan became the
largest rice importer in the world. On December 14, 1993 the
Japanese government accepted a limited opening of the rice market
under the GATT plan. Currently, 1994's bumper rice crop has
resulted in much of imported rice piling up, unused at warehouses
throughout the nation [Cordy, Jennifer."Growing Japanese Rice Glut
is Causing a Sticky Situation for Foreign Growers", Asian Wall
Street Journal Weekly (September 5,1994.): A4.] In 1994, Japan
harvested 11.98 million tons of rice in 1994, compared with 7.83
million tons last year.] (This is similar to Japan Apple Imports
case, see APPLE case).

2. Description

This case was actually involved in the bilateral trade negotiations
of the United States and Japan. The logic of US's demand for the
Japanese opening of the rice market was theoretically derived from
US's US$50 billion trade deficits with Japan [Smith, Charles.
"Staple of Dispute: Tokyo Hints at Concessions on Rice Trade," Far
Eastern Economic Review (vol.155. no.40, October 28, 1993.): 33.]
Therefore, this GATT proposal was seen as the one part that forms
a linkage of the US-Japan trade dispute. It was a symbolic issue,
representing "Japan's sagging, heavily regulated" market, along
with sectors such as medical equipment, telecommunications, and
insurance auto parts.[Sapsford, Jathon and Williams, Michael, "Panel
Proposes Basic Shift in Japan Economic Policy," Asian Wall Street
Journal Weekly (December 20,1993.): A7. ] Rice has encouraged the
world to blame Japanese protectionism for the country's vast trade
surplus.["The Voice of Rice: Korean for Protection," The Economist.
(vol.7841, no.329. December 11, 1993.):34.] Accordingly
manufactures have been major beneficiaries of the multilateral
trade regime and will not view a Japanese-instigated collapse of
the Uruguay Round with equanimity ["Away from the Brink: Japan on
Defensive as GATT Talks Look to Restart" Far Eastern Economic
Review. (December 23, 1992.): 53. For another example, Shinroku
Morohashi, chairman of Mitsubishi Corp., expressed his satisfaction
with the rice liberalization, saying "Hosokawa (prime minister) has
shown international common sense." ].On the other hand, Japan
argues that foreign rice must be barred to ensure self-sufficiency
in the country's food staple. From the international trade
perspective, only 3 to 4% of the world rice production --roughly
14metric tons-- goes for export. The US's share of world
production is 2%. [The Economist. "Starters-and-Stripes Sushi: Rice
Production," (November 27, 1993.):30.]

As the background of this dispute, the United States Rice Millers
Association (RMA) asked for a quota of up to 2.5% of the Japanese
market. Although the US Trade Representative (USTR) turned down this
request in October 1986, it agreed to put it on the agenda for the
Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1987. Onward,
the US demanded the Japanese open the rice market via the 108
nation GATT. In 1993, the Clinton administration trade policymakers
indicated that the White House would act on petition under Sanction
301 if Japan decided to maintain its ban on rice. The Japanese
counterpart, the powerful Central Union of Agricultural
Cooperatives opposed strongly. Furthermore, opposition against
lifting the import ban came not only from farmers but also from
consumers. In the late 1993, Japanese were boiled over this
historical rice dispute.

For the Japanese, this case was focused from its self-sufficiency
point of view, as well as from the cultural implications of rice.
In 1989, Japan was the world's largest net agricultural products
importer and its self-sufficiency ratio has been slumped to 46% in
1991 (in comparison to France 143%, US 113%, W Germany 94%). The
Japanese consume 26% of the total calories from rice, the largest
source of caloric intake. However, it has dramatically decreased by
half, from that of in 1960 (50%). [Soda, Osamu. Fact about Japan:
Japanese Agriculture, (International Society for Educational
Information. Tokyo, 1993.):6.] Calorie self-sufficiency has
constantly declined after the World War II: in 1965, 73%, in 1985,
52%, and in 1991, 46%. Among the major products, such as wheat
(12%), soybean (4%), beef (52%), sugar (36%), only rice is the
self-sufficient (100%) product.[Soda, Osamu. Fact about Japan:
Japanese Agriculture, (International Society for Educational
Information. Tokyo, 1993.):4.] As of 1990, total Japanese
agricultural production had a value of 11.42 trillion yen broken
down as follows: rice 28%, livestock 27%, vegetables 23%, fruit 9%,
and others 13%[Soda, Osamu. Fact about Japan: Japanese Agriculture,
(International Society for Educational Information. Tokyo,
1993.):5. ].

Since the Japanese domestic rice price is as seven times as high as
the international rice price, ratification of rice might force the
Japanese to go out of farming. Accordingly the Japanese might not
achieve rice self-sufficiency in the 21st century. This raise
questions on the Japanese national security. Rice is also the
center of Japanese traditional village-based culture; for example,
in Japanese the word rice (gohan) means meal. For instance, in
Japanese "did you eat a meal?" is literally, "did you eat rice?"
Currently, the Japanese government predicts nation will not begin
substantial rice imports until late 1995, because there are ample
leftover supplies from the bumper 1994 domestic crop.["Japanese Say
Substantial Imports of Rice Unlikely Until Late 1995," Journal of
Commerce. (April 11 1995.):A5.]

3. Related Cases

Korean Case Korea also negotiated with GATT multilateral trade
negotiation for its opening of rice market. Korea accepted the same
agreement as Japan accepted, with 10 years moratorium period. Prime
Minister Kim Young Sam apologized to farmers for ending government
protection of the market and eliminating subsidies.[Shanda Islam.
"A Deal, of Sorts: GATT Comes up with an 11th-Hour Global Trade
Accord." Far Eastern Economic Review. (vol.156. no.50. December
23, 1993.):54.] However this decision impact on Korea much worse
than on Japan. In Korea the portion of rice producer to the total
GNP is 3.1%, whereas Japanese counterpart is only 0.6% in
1991[Hasegawa, Hiroshi. "Read the Six Years; After the Opening Rice
Market (Kome Koaiho Rokunengo O Yomu)." in Asahi Shinbun Weekly
AREA ( December 20, 1993. Tokyo.):16-17]. Korean farmers' one forth
of income is derived from rice; on the contrary in Japan, it
consist of only one eighth of income. According to an estimate of
Korean Foreign Economic Institute, as a result of this concession,
Korea could correct its trade surplus to US by 1400 million dollar
a year. On the other hand, Korean farmers would lose 50 million
dollar a year[Ibid. p.16.].

(1) Keyword Clusters
(1): Trade Product = Rice
(2): Bio-geography = Temp
(3): Environmental Problem = Habitat Loss

4. Draft Author: Junko Saito

B. LEGAL Clusters

5. Discourse and Status: Agreement and Complete

Agreement was reached on December 15,1993. According to the
agreement, ratification of rice imports will come into effect after
a six-year period during which a fixed, but limited quantity of
rice (between 4%, 4m ton to 8%, 8m ton of total consumption [Smith,
Charles. "Rice Resolve: Tokyo Makes Last-Minute Concession on
Imports," Far Eastern Economic Review (vol.156. no.50, December
23, 1993.): 14. ]) will be imported. This implementation might
affect on the Food Control Law, which provides the government with
strong power over the rice market and allows it to restrict
imports. It was originally legislated during the World War II, to
centralized the authority of providing food on the government. The
law either might have to be revised or given a new interpretation
to allow market forces to operate.

6. Forum and Scope: Japan and Multilateral

7. Decision Breadth: MULTI (USA, Thailand, Myanmar, etc.)
Japanese participation in the world rice trade has significant
effects on world rice trade. Iwakura [The director general for
agricultural policy at the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan]
argues that the world market can not accommodate another major
importer. "If Japan were buy 1 million tones of rice in the next 12
months that would be certain to push prices sharply."[ ]Actually
international prices have been rising almost daily since it became
apparent that Japan would be a major player in the thin world
market for rice.[Smith, Charles. "Steamed Up : Japan's Rice-Import
Ban Stays, Despite Shortfall", Far Eastern Economic Review,
(vol.156. no.41, October 14, 1993.):73.]

On the other hand, suddenly the export of rice polishing equipment
is growing. Asian countries have begun to improve the quality of
their rice, in preparation for the expansion of the global rice
trade predicted in the wake of the Uruguay Round Agricultural
Agreement. Since Japanese equipment is said to be the best in the
world, in 1995 manufactures of rice polishing equipment expect an
increase of 30% of to 50% in the value of exports over 1994.[Japan
Agrinfo Newsletter, (vol.12, no.6, International Agricultural
Council, Tokyo, February 1995): 5]

8. Legal Standing: TREATY
The GATT provision was invoked in this case. The Japanese
government shifted a ban on rice import in December 1993.

C. GEOGRAPHIC Clusters

9. Geographic Locations
a. Geographic Domain : ASIA
b. Geographic Site : EAST ASIA
c. Geographic Impact : JAPAN

10. Sub-National Factors: NO

11. Type of Habitat: Temperate [TEMP]

D. TRADE Clusters

12. Type of Measure: QUOTA [QUOTA] Japan will import 4 % (4 metric
ton) to 8% (8 metric ton) of rice from 1994 to 2000. This quota is
called as "minimum access clause" and this is the previous
moratorium stage toward tariffication.

13. Direct vs. Indirect Impacts: Indirect

14. Relation of Measure to Environmental Impact
a. Directly Related : YES
b. Indirectly Related : No
c. Not Related : No
d. Process Related : YES (Rice Paddy Loss)

15. Trade Product Identification: Agricultural Production, Rice

16. Economic Data
Total farmers/Total Japanese population : 10.9% (1991)
Number of farming house holds: 3.8 million 3.1% (1991)
Agricultural products/total GNP: 2.4% (1991)
Rice production/total GNP: 0.6% (1991)
Rice income/total agricultural income per house hold: 4.0% (1991)
Full time farmer/ Part time farmer : 12.1% (1991)
Rice paddy/ Japanese total land: 13.7% (1992)

17. Impact of Measure on Trade Competitiveness: BAN

18. Industry Sector: FOOD

19. Exporter and Importer US and Japan

The agricultural Ministry planed to import 200.000 metric tons of
foreign rice by the end of 1993, mainly from Thailand. Japan
imported 500.000 to 600.000 metric tons of rice from Thailand in
1994. The rest purchased from the US and China.[Owens, Cynthia.
"Thai Could Get Gob Boost if Japan Opens Rice Market." Asian Wall
Street Journal Weekly. (December 13, 1993.): A20.] Only 3-4% of
world rice production -roughly 14m tones- goes for export.
American's share of export world production is barely 2%, yet, it
ships out about 18% of all the rice in international trade, a
proportion second only to Thailand's.[The Economist. "Starters-and
-Stripes Sushi: Rice Production," (November 27, 1993.):30 ] The
international rice market itself is thin, no homogeneous, and
highly influenced by trade restrictions. The "thin market" problem
of rice trade is compounded by the fact that many consumers prefer
specific types and qualities of rice.[Gail L. Cramer, Eric J.
Waules, and Shangna Shui. "Impact of Liberalizing Trade in the
World Rice Market." American Journal of Agricultural Economy.(
vol.75. Feburuay,1993):219 ]

E. ENVIRONMENT Clusters

20. Environmental Problem Type: Source Problem [DEFOR] (potential
rice paddy loss)

Rice paddies contributes to maintain Japanese environmental
condition through the securing of greenbelt zones and the water
purification and groundwater enrichment.

21. Name, Type, and Diversity of Species

Name: Rice
Type: Japonica rice
Diversity: NA

Two major rice types are indica and japonica. Strong consumer
preferences for particular rice types are based primarily on
cooking and taste characteristics. Japonica rice is relatively
sticky when it cooked and has shorter, thicker grain. It also
called "short rice."

22. Impact and Effect: LOW and Scale
23. Urgency and Lifetime: MEDIUM / several years
24. Substitutes: CONSV

VI. OTHER Factors

25. Culture: Yes

For the Japanese the symbolic importance of rice is deeply rooted
in the Japanese cosmology: rice as soul, rice as pure money, and
ultimately, rice as self. During Edo era (1603-1867), rice was
circulated as intermediate, money. Sushi is one of the
traditional cooking methods. Originally, it was one way to
preserve fish, putting rice and fish alternately in a wooden pail,
for fermenting. Nowadays this kind of sushi is called
"oshi-shushi."

Even though the Japanese had the custom of eating rice since
ancient times, only after the nineteenth century, did rice became
the national food staple. Therefore rice has been valued as a
special food, associated with rituals. Rice harvest rituals, both
among the folk and at the imperial court, have been a major
cultural institution.

The Japanese emperor originally was the
shaman who celebrated rice harvest in ancient times. Harvest ritual
celebrate cosmic rejuvenation through an exchange of their souls,
that is, selves, as objectified in rice. People believed that rice
had mysterious super-natural power. One example can be seen in an
ancient custom; people shook rice in bamboo and let the dying
person hears the sound at his deathbed. On mountainsides, people
called rice "the Buddhist saint (Bosastu)." The word "offering (to
the God)," osonae, itself used to refer to the rice cake prepared
for ritual services. It means that the rice had been used as main
servings for the formal rituals to God.

Rice is not a mere grain,
rather a personified thing that has soul. People perceived rice
cropping to be closely connected to the super-natural, religious
behavior, rather than an economic activity.

Rice farmers had a
notion of "ina-dama," the soul of rice, and personified a rice.
Therefore even today, people believe that the soul of rice, which
is called the God of rice paddy, dwell in the last rice stubble.
The person who reaped the last rice would bring it back home and
hold service. This custom is still practiced at the rice harvest
rituals.

Rice paddies have been a common theme portrayed in woodblocks
prints, printings, and contemporary posters in travel agents'
offices to attract urbanites to "the countryside." They have been
intimately portrayed in the representation of agriculture, the
countryside, the seasons, and the past. As a metaphor for self,
rice paddies are our ancestral land, our village, our region, and
ultimately, our land, Japan. Therefore, the Japanese has strong
cultural attachments to rice.
26. Trans-Border: No
27. Rights: NO
28. Relevant Literature

Ohunuki-Tierey, Emiko. Rice as Self. (Princeton University Press.
1993.)

Avery, P. William. World Agriculture and the GATT. (Lynne Reinner
Publishers. 1993.)

Inoue, Hisashi. Inoue Hisashi no Kome Koza[Mr. Inoue's Lecture on
Rice.] (Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten. 1989.)

-------------- Zoku-Inoue Hisashi no Kome Koza [Mr. Inoue's Lecture
on Rice: Part II.] (Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten. 1991.)


References

Asahi Nenkan 1994 [Asahi Yearbook 1994] (Asahi Shinbun sha, 1993,
Tokyo.):164-167.

The Economist. "Starters-and -stripes Sushi: Rice Production,"
(November 27, 1993.):30.

---------------. "The Voice of Rice: Korean for Protection,"
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---------------. "Ricable: World Trade," (vol.7831. no.329. October
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Freidland, Jonathan and Smith, Charls. "Staple of Dispute: Tokyo
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Gail L. Cramer, Eric J. Waules, and Shangna Shui. "Impact of
Liberalizing Trade in the World Rice Market." American Journal of
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Fukui, Yuki. "Japan agriculture on the Rips," Tokyo Business Today.
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-------------------. "Jiristu seyo Kome Noumin[Rice Farmers, Be
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------------------. Japan Agrinfo Newsletter, (vol.11, no.12,
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Islam, Shanda. "A Deal, of Sorts: Gatt Comes up with an 11th-Hour
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-------------. "Steamed Up : Japan's Rice-Import Ban Stays, Despite
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-------------. "Staple of Dispute: Tokyo Hints at Concessions on
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Yamagata, Yuichiro. "Probing the Impact of the Uruguay Round" Tokyo
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Wander, Berber. "Rice Decision Strains Coalition Unity, Jeopardized
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Economic Institute Report.(no. 46b, December 17, 1993.):5-7.

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